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Murray Shanahan has been actively involved in research on the frame problem since the
late eighties. When a scientist looks back at the past of his field, including his own early
work, he can see how poorly the subject was understood years ago, and then two attitudes
are possible. One is to think: It’s amazing how naive and confused we used to be; much of
this work should have never appeared in print, and the rest should have been expressed very
differently! Or he can adopt a wiser view of the history of his field as a reasonable—maybe
necessary—path towards the better understanding that is available today.
This respect for the past, with all its embarrassing mistakes, is an attractive quality of
Shanahan’s book. He believes that the history of attempts to solve the frame problem
isn’t an arbitrary record of failures which culminates in the discovery of a truth
which, in hindsight, seems obvious. Rather, it seems to me to reflect a natural
order of enquiry. The dead ends that people have investigated are much more than
mistakes. They’re obvious possibilities, which any thinker engaged in studying
the frame problem is wont to investigate. A deep understanding of the knowledge
representation issues surrounding the frame problem can only be acquired by getting
a feel for the space of mathematical possibilities and where they lead. [p. xv]
The book is about the history of research on the frame problem as much as about our
current state of knowledge. This may be the only way a good book can be written today on
a subject as volatile as the theory of commonsense knowledge and reasoning.
The book is not a comprehensive survey of the history of the problem: it is mostly about
the work done within the “Stanford University/Imperial College axis”, that is to say, about
the approaches that use the situation calculus and circumscription (John McCarthy) and
the event calculus and logic programming (Bob Kowalski). There are also good pages on
several other directions of work, including default logic, the explanation closure method,
and action languages.
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In the introductory chapters, after discussing the role of knowledge representation in
AI and the role of logic in knowledge representation, the frame problem is described as
a problem that arises when we attempt to represent properties of actions using logic. In
addition to specifying the changes caused by performing a particular kind of action,
we also have to describe what does not change. Otherwise, we find that we cannot use
the description to draw any useful conclusions. . . The frame problem is the problem
of constructing a formal framework that enables us to do just this. [p. 1]
The first half of the book is mostly about developing such a framework using circumscrip-
tion. The second half stresses the ideas that come from logic programming.
Given Shanahan’s attention to the history of the subject, it is not surprising that Yale
shooting scenario is the longest entry in his index. Yale shooting is not mentioned very
often in today’s research on actions. After all, the example is quite elementary, it has no
features that are of interest to us today: no indirect effects, no implicit preconditions, no
nondeterminism, no concurrency, no sensing, no complex actions, no continuous time,
no counterfactuals. But it remains the most memorable of the past embarassments of the
commonsense reasoning community.
This counterexample demonstrated that the first serious attempt to apply circumscription
to the frame problem [11] was unsatisfactory. The discussion of possible ways to overcome
this difficulty has led the authors of the example to drastic conclusions:
This problem is shown to be independent of the logic used; nor does it depend on
any particular temporal representation. Upon analyzing the failure we find that the
nonmonotonic logics we considered are inherently incapable of representing this
kind of default reasoning. [7, p. 379]
This seemed particularly convincing because the senior author of the paper, Drew
McDermott, was known as one of the creators of formal nonmonotonic reasoning, an
enthusiastic supporter of the logic approach to AI, and a co-author of an influential textbook
written from the “logicist” position [2]. After the discovery of the shooting example, he
changed his views. His other paper written around the same time “draws mostly negative
conclusions about . . . the progress we can expect” in logic-based AI [13].
The reaction of many other “logicists” was opposite: they saw the shooting example
as an inspiring challenge. The main lesson they learned from that example is that in logic-
based AI, as in any other area of science, mathematics should be taken seriously. The claim
in [11] which Hanks and McDermott found to be incorrect (“The following set of situation
calculus axioms solves the frame problem”) is not proved there. This is understandable:
describing the effect of the circumscription proposed in [11] is a difficult mathematical
problem. But the question is not even mentioned there as a topic for future research.
Interestingly, the discussion of the counterexample in [7] does not include a satisfactory
mathematical proof either: the authors restrict attention to the finitely many situations that
are explicitly mentioned in the scenario and disregard the existence of infinitely many other
situations definable in the language. (This can be easily fixed.)
When mathematicians are lucky, the concepts that they define behave exactly as
intuitively expected. Usually they are not so lucky. The Taylor series for a function f
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may converge to a function that is different from f . Mathematicians have learned to live
with facts like this, and they even find them useful. Because of the differences between
what is expected and what is true, they make sure to verify all their conjectures, no matter
how plausible, by reasoning. It is crucial for further progress that students of commonsense
knowledge be prepared to do difficult mathematics.
There is a lot of mathematics in Shanahan’s book, most of it about the semantics and
properties of nonmonotonic formalisms. The invention of these formalisms was motivated
to a large degree by the need to solve the frame problem, and the book can serve as
an introduction to formal nonmonotonic reasoning. All terminology and notation are
carefully defined, beginning with those related to the language of predicate calculus. Some
particularly long proofs are relegated to appendices.
The second lesson of Yale shooting is that not all nonmonotonic formalisms are created
equal. Researchers at Imperial were not impressed by the shooting example as much as
those at Stanford. Indeed, the logic programming solution to the frame problem described
by Shanahan in Section 12.1, which handles the Yale shooting scenario correctly, is not a
special trick invented in response to Hanks and McDermott; it is based on what the author
remembered from the undergraduate lectures Kowalski gave back in 1981, long before the
invention of the counterexample. For Kowalski and his students, Yale shooting was not
even a challenge.
Default logic and autoepistemic logic are similar in this sense to logic programming.
Each of these systems can be viewed as an extension of the language of Prolog with
negation as failure [1,4], so that the logic programming formalization mentioned above
can be easily restated in terms of either formalism. An autoepistemic equivalent of
Kowalski’s logic program was actually rediscovered in [5]. Moreover, as we learned
from [15], the “frame default” from Reiter’s 1980 paper in which default logic was
originally introduced [14] works correctly—the claims to the contrary by Hanks and
McDermott notwithstanding—provided that the rest of the default theory is set up the right
way.
Reasoning involved in the Yale shooting story is an example of “temporal projection”—
determining the effect of a given sequence of actions executed in a given initial situation.
A large part of the book under review is about more complex forms of temporal reasoning,
including those that involve incomplete narratives and concurrency.
It is unfortunate that two important lines of research are not mentioned in the book
at all: nonmonotonic causal logics and satisfiability planning. The seminal papers by
Geffner [3] and by Kautz and Selman [8] are not even included in the bibliography. Perhaps
the significance of these papers was not as clear when Shanahan’s manuscript was being
finalized as it is today.
Geffner’s work has led to several interesting solutions to the frame problem. Some of
them use circumscription [6,9], and this circumscription is of a very simple kind. The
formulation given in [10] is “rule-based”; it is similar (and closely related) to both logic
programming and default logic. The solutions to the frame problem proposed in these
three papers would not be out of place in a book that emphasises circumscription and logic
programming. The first of the three is actually mentioned by Shanahan, but not discussed
in any detail.
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The ideas of Kautz and Selman have led to the creation of powerful systems for
reasoning about actions and planning, such as BLACKBOX 1 and CCALC. 2 The former is
a very efficient (by today’s standards) planner that accepts a description of actions in the
language of STRIPS, designed by “logicists” Fikes and Nilsson, and uses propositional
solvers for search. The latter uses a search mechanism of the same kind (although
somewhat less sophisticated) and can perform, besides planning, many forms of temporal
reasoning discussed in Shanahan’s book. Its input language is the language from [10],
considerably more expressive than STRIPS. The reader should have a look at these systems
if he believes that “logicists” only prove theorems but never write programs. These days,
they do both.
In spite of these omissions, Solving the Frame Problem is an important contribution to
the literature on logical AI. It is clearly written, intellectually stimulating and enjoyable to
read.
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